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BUCKING THE SYSTEM
ANDREW WILKIE AND THE DIFFICULT TASK
OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER
WHISTLEBLOWERS ARE PART of society's alarm and
self· repair system, bringing attention to problems
before they become fur more damaging. l Austral-
ian whistlcblowers have spoken du[ abollt police
corrupcion, paedophilia in the churches, corporate
mismanagement, biased appointment procedures,
environmentally harmful practices and a host of
other issues.
Although whistleblowers are extremely valuable
to society, most of them 5utler enormously for their
efforts. Ostracism, harassment, slander, reprimands,
referral to psychiatrists, demotion, dismissal and
blacklisting arc among the common methods used to
attack whistleblowers. Bosses are the usual attackers
with co-workers sometimes joining in.
Many whisdeblowers are conscientious, high-
performing employees who believe that the system
works. That's why they speak out. They believe that
by alerting others to a problem, it will be dealt with.
Many do not think of themselves as whistleblowers,
at all - they believe they arc just doing their job.
So they are shaken to the core when the response
to their public-spirited enons is to vilify them as
disloyal, to question their work performance, to
withdraw emotional support and to mount attacks.
As well as suffering financial losses and severe stress,
whistleblowers are at increased risk of relationship
breakdown and health problems.
Even worse than this, though, few whistleblowers
seem to bring about any change in the problem they
speak out about. The treatment of whistleblowers is
a double disaster for society: capable and courageous
indi\riduals arc attacked and sometimes destroyed,
while the original problems arc left to tester.
Bill Toomer W'1S \Vestern Australia's senior
quarantine inspector in 1973 when he requested
fi.lmigation of a ship in Fremantle because of the
presence of mice and rats. Fumigation is costly and
time-consuming and hence disliked by shipowners.
Previously, in Victoria, Toomer had rdllsed bribes
to ignore intestations ofships. [n the Fremantle case,
Toomer was overruled by his superior and bdore
long was fined, demoted and transferred. [n 1980,
due to the pressure, he retired at age 45. [n the past
three decades, his case has been brought before
numerous politicians and 'lgencies, including the
Ombudsman, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
and the Merit Protection and Review Agency, with
a number of them holding formal inquiries. Even
today, Toomer's supporters continue to petition the
government tor compensation and have gathered
evidence that Toomer was set up in Fremantle tor
removal from ship quarantine duties. 2
For onc man to lose his career is bad enough.
For millions of dollars to be spent on inquiries is
an added burden. But in some ways worst of all is
that focusing on the treatment ofToomer distracted
attention from the original issue of corruption in
quarantine inspections.
Mick Skrijel was a craytisherman in South
Australia in 1978 when he reponed to police and
politicians what he thought were drug drops off
the coast. Afterwards, his catches were stolen, his
boat was destroyed by fire, his house was partially
burnt and he was bashed. Moving to Victoria in the
19805, his allegations were passed to the newly crc-
ated National Crime Authority. Skrijelleaflt:tcd and
picketed NCA headquarters over its inaction - and
then the NCA investigated Skrijel himselt~ who went
to prison for five months after a raid found explosives
and marijuana on his property. His convicrion was
later quashed by the Victorian Slipreme Court: the
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judges t(JUnd the explosives and marijuana could
have been planted. Investigating the matter at the
request of the government, QC David Quick recom·
mended an inquiry, with royal commission powers,
into the possibility that Skrijd was framed, but the
government dedined. 3
Vast efforts have been made by Skrijcl and his sup·
porters topursue justice over his case. Somewhere
along the line, the original issue ofthe South Austral·
ian drug trade dropped off the main agenda.
These are but sketches of cases that are incred-
ibly complicated, as are most whistleblower stories.
But after he;'lring hundreds of such stories, there is
;'I burning question that is easy to articulate: How
can whistleblowcrs do better?
DISSIPATING OUTRAGE
To develop better tactics tor whistleblowers, it is
useful to examine injustices that cause outrage.
Consider, tor example, the Dili massacre.~ On 12
November 1991, thousands ofEast Timorese joined
a funeral procession in DiU, using the occasion to
protest against the Indonesian occupation of the
country. As the crowd entered Santa Cruz cemetery,
Indonesian troops that had surrounded the marchers
opened fire without warning.
Unlike earlier massacres, this atrocity was wit·
nessed by Western journalists and captured on video-
tape by filmmaker Max Stahl. Their reports led to
international outrage against the Indonesian occupi-
ers and a massive boost for the international support
movement for East Timorese independence. The
brutal assault on the funeral procession, intended to
intimidate and subdue the independence movement,,
instead had the opposite effect of greatly increasing
support for it. In short, the attack backfired on the
Indonesian government.
In attacks like this, there are five methods com·
monly llsed by attackers to inhibit olltrage. The first is
cover·up. In previous massacres in East Timor, censor·
ship had prevented information getting out in a timely
and authoritative tashion. After the Dili massacre, the
Indonesians cut otfphone services out of East Timor.
They also alerted Australian customs to search lvbx
Stahl, but he wisely gave his videotapes to someone
else who smuggled them out of East Timor.
The second method of inhibiting outrage is to
devalue the target. Indonesian officials madc deroga·
tory comments about the protesters, tor example
calling them "scum", but this abuse, and Javanese
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assun~ptionsofethnic superiority, had little salience
outside Illdonesia.
Thc third method is to reinterpret the events.
Illdol1esi.Ul officials blamcd the events on the pro·
tcsters, alleging they provoked the attack and that
the shooting was unintentional. They gave a figure of
just nineteen dcad, later raising it to fifty. A separate
investigation counted at least 271 killed.
The tourth method of inhibiting outrage is to
use official channels such as inquiries and courts to
give the appearance ofjustice. Immediately after the
Dili massacrc, the Indonesian government set lip an
inquiry, which gave mild sentences to a tcw officials.
The Indonesian military had its own inquiry that
whitewashed the perpetrators.
The fit1:h and final method regularly used to in·
hibit outrage from injustice is intimidation and brib·
cry of targets, witnesses and functionaries. After the
shooting, Indonesian troops arrested, beat and killed
numerous East Timorese independence supporters.
This may have intimidated some East Timorese but
it had little dfect on international audiences.
By looking at methods of inhibiting outrage, it
is possible to gain insight into how to promote out·
rage. Cover·up can be countered by methods such
as collecting documents, writing stories and using
alternative media. Devaluation can be countered
by humanising people under attack, tor example
through meetings and personal stories. Reinter·
pretation can be countered by presenting the taers
and emphasising the injustice involved. The false
appe'1rance of justice though official channels can be
countered by avoiding or discrediting these chan·
nds. Intimidation and bribery can be countered by
renlsing to acquiesce and by exposing these methods
as improper.
Whistlebl.owing usually involves a double injus·
tice. First is the problem - corruption, abuse, a haz-
ard to the public - about which.1 person speaks out.
Second is the treatment of the whistleblower. Both
of these have the potential to backfire, ifpeople rec·
ogllise them as matters tor concern and intormation
about them is communicated to receptive audiences.
Thadore it is predictable that perpetrators will use
these five methods of inhibiting outrage. That is
exactly wh~lt can be observed in case after case.
WHAT HAPPENS TO WHISTLEBLOWERS
Those.: who .1ttack whisrleblowers usually like to keep
things quiet. Only foolish cmplo}'crs al1l10uIlce to
the world that they have sacked a prominent dissi-
dent. vVhcn whistlcblowt:rs go to court, employers
often agree to a settlement under the condition
that neither party speaks about the settkmcnt itself
Acceptance of such a so-called gagging or silencing
clause is often ,1 precondition for a settlement.
Whistleblowers often want to keep things quiet
too. Many of them<jre embarrassed and humiliated
by the allegations against them and do not want
others to be aware oftheir difficulties. Often they are
making complaints to official bodies and assume that
publicity will hurt tht:ir case. In many cases, lawyers
advise keeping quiet. The upshot is that whistleblow·
el's commonly cooperate with employers in covering
up intormation about what is happening. The same
applies to the original problem about which they
spoke up. The result is th,lt outrage is minimised.
The second method of inhibiting olltrage is to
devalue the target, in this case the whistleblower.
This is part of the standard treatment: harassment,
referral to psychiatrists, reprimands and the like are
potent means of discrediting a person in the eyes of
fellow workers. Spreading of rumours is part of the
package, including malicious comments about the
whistleblower's work performance, personal behav-
iour and mental state. To counter this, whistleblow-
ers need to behave impeccably - a difficult task when
under intense scrutiny and immense stress - and to
document their good performance and behaviour.
This can be done, but only if the whistleblower is
able and willing to muster the information and make
it available.
Reinterpretation of the events is the third method
of inhibiting outrage. Employers typically deny any,
wrongdoing and say that treatment ofthe employee
is completely justified ;,llld nothing to do with public
interest disclosures. Whistkblowers need to chal-
lenge the official line by providing solid documenta-
tion tor everyone of their claims.
The fourth method is to use official channels that
give only the appearancc of justice. An employer
might dismiss an employee and then, when the
employee challenges the decision, put the matter
through an appeal process that rubber-stamps the
original decision. That is indeed what happens in
many cases. But there is another dimension to of-
ficial channels. vVhistlcblowcrs regularly go to out-
side bodies, such as ombudsmen, auditor-generals,
Jnti-corruption commissions, ~ldministrative appeals
tribunals and courts. They cont;'lCt politicians. They
try to invoke whistlcblower protection laws.
It is easy to assume that these bodies do indeed
provide justice. In practice, whistleblowers find
that they almost never work. In the largest study of
whistleblowers in Australia, William De Maria found
that they reported being helped by an official body ill
tewer than one out of ten approaches, and in many
cases they were worse otT.5
Yet most whistleblowers believe that justice is to
be found somewhere in the system. So they make a
submission to an agency, wait months or years and
then, when the result is negativc, go on to another
agency. This is an ideal way to reduce outragc from
the injusticc being done, because the official bodies
give the appearance, though seldom the substancc,
ofdispensing justice.to
The fifth method ofil1hibiting outrage is through
intimidation and bribery. Whistleblowers are often
intimidated by threats and actual reprisals, and the
way they arc treated serves as an object lesson to
co-workers, most of whom avoid the whisdeblower
for fear ofbecoming a target themselves. Employees
know that their jobs are safer if they do not speak
out; sometimes promotions are in order if they join
in a witch-hunt.
It is perhaps no surprise that all five methods of
inhibiting outrage are found in whistleblower cases.
What is disturbing is that whistleblowers so often
collaborate in these methods, especially in covcr-
lip and using official channels. They can be highly
reluctant to focus on taking thcir message to the
widest possible audience. Yet this has proved time
and again the most etlcctive way to mobilise support
for addressing the matter raised by the whiscleblower
and tor providing personal protection from repris-
als. 7 It so happens that the recommendations of
experienced whistleblower advisers challenge each
of the methods of inhibiting outrage."
ANDREW WILKIE
Just a week before the United States government
launched its invasion ofIraq in March 2003, Andrew
Wilkic, an analyst in the Otlice of Nation;'ll Asst:ss~
ments, resigned from his position and challenged
the Australian government's reasons for joining
the assault.9 Through good sense ,1I1d good luck,
Wilkie avoided everyone of the trJps that sn;,lre
most whistleblowcrs.
First, and most importantly, Wilkic spoke out
in public. He did not rcport his/concerns through
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official channels by writing; a memo or talking to
his boss. Instead, he contacted veteran journalist
Lauric: Oakcs, who made Wilkic's resignation and
revelations into a top news story. Wilkk stuck with
this approach, doing numerous interviews and giving
m,lIly talks in the following months. His approach
was the antithesis of cover-up.
Second;becausc of who he was and how he be-
haved, Wilkie resisted devaluation, His background
was conservative. In public, he wore a suit and tie
and spoke calmly and tactually, a terrific performance
for someone under so much stress, His background,
demeanour and principled stand undermined at-
tempts to portray him as a traitor or a radical. \OVhen
government figures made personal aspersions against
Wilkie in Parliamem and claimed that he was not an
Iraq expert, this backfired as journalists exposed their
unscrupulous behaviour and double standards. lU
Third, Wilkie kept the focus on the main issue, the
official reasons for Australia joining the attack on Iraq.
He consistendy countered the government line and did
not get distracted into issues outside his expertise.
Fourth, by resigning, Wilkie avoided all the usual
reprisals at work. He also avoided the exhausting .1I1d
time-consuming appeals to various official bodies.
Fifth, Wilkie stood up to intimidation. He might
have been charged under one of the government
acts that require public servants to keep quiet, but
by going public he made it difficult for the govern-
ment to act against him. By speaking out, he also
resisted the bribery implicit in holding a job by
keeping quiet.
Wilkie had perfeCt timing. To maximise outrage, a
message needs to get to an audience when it is most,
receptive. Just betore the invasion of Iraq was the
ideal time, when media attention was intense and de-
bate over justifications was fierce. Wilkie punctured
the apparent unanimity ofgovernment Iraq experts,
and so made a tremendous impact on the debate.
Wilkie's timing was also ideal in that m;.\ss protest
against the Iraq invasion was at its height: there was
a large receptive audience for his message.
According to the backfire model, Wilkie did just
about everything right. But that does not mean
things were easy for him. After all, he sacrificed his
career tor the sake ofspeaking out. It is worthwhile
remembering though tlut large numbers ofwhistle·
blowers lose their careers, and years of their lives,
in a liItile etlort to obtain justice within the system.
Seldom do they have ~\I\Y bsting efTecr on the issue
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about which they raised the <tbrm. Whistleblowers
have much to learn about being effcctive. Whether
or not onc agrees with Wilkie's claims about Iraq, his
method of speaking out is a model tor others.
Whistleblowers and their supporters have much to
gain by thinking strategically. If they put themselves
in the shoes of the guilty parties, they can imagine
tactics that will keep the main issue otT the public
agenda. Cover-up, attacks on the credibility of the
whistleblower, rationalisations and intimidation,
are predictable, so preparations should be made to
counter them. Official channels also serve to keep
issues out of the public eye by moving attention to
the treatment of the whistleblower and treating the
matter in-hollse. It is an immense challenge to most
whistleblowers to stop assuming justice can be ob-
tained within the system and instead to seek. support
and vindication in the court of public opinion.
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